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Abstract 
The idea that Artificial Intelligence will be one of the foremost sources of innovation in years to come is one 
that goes well beyond the field of academia.  
One relevant issue in this connection is understanding the likely impact of these technologies on productivity. 
Indeed, the impacts of earlier introductions of disruptive technology in history – such as the industrial revolution 
and the mechanisation of agriculture – suggest that the automation of existing tasks can produce extraordinary 
increases in productivity (Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2019).  
To assess the growth potential of this new wave of innovation, in this study we examine the impact of AI 
technologies on total factor productivity.  
This involves analysing improvements in productivity by firms who have patented AI technologies. In particular, 
we exploit a novel dataset of AI patents at firm level, to analyse whether the extent with which firms develop 
AI technologies positively affects productivity and wages.  
Also, we draw attention to two sectors that are more extensively adopting AI – e-commerce and fintech 
firms. 
Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, patents, total factor productivity (TFP), wage growth, generalised method of 
moments (GMM), firm level data, e-commerce, fintech 
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Executive summary 
This study aims to provide both EU and national authorities with independent scientific evidence to help tackle 
one of the big social challenges related to new digital technologies and the functioning of labour markets: how 
AI patents will affect company productivity (also with a focus on e-commerce and fintech firms). 
It was produced by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), a research hub providing science and knowledge services 
to the European Commission. 
Importance of AI 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is re-modelling economies, promising to support productivity, boost efficiency and 
decrease costs. With its key contribution – making ever more accurate predictions and well-balanced decisions 
– AI has the potential to enhance quality of life for vast numbers of people, through growth, social improvements 
and innovation (OECD, 2019).  
In its Communication, the European Commission proposes a European approach that help develop AI 
applications in key sectors, including the digital economy.  
Artificial Intelligence is attracting the attention of academia, policymakers, industry and society at large – and 
for good reason. According to predictions by Price Water House Coopers, these technologies could raise global 
GDP by 13.1 trillion euros – a full 14% – by 2030  (Verweij & Rao, 2017).  
Europe’s share of this – 3rd largest, behind China and North America – is predicted to be in the order of 2.7 
trillion euros. Indeed, to become the global leader AI by 2030, China is investing 125 billion euros (West & Allen, 
2018).  
Definition of AI 
The European Commission report ‘Artificial Intelligence, a European perspective’ (Craglia et al., 2018) contains 
a broad definition: AI includes ‘any machine or algorithm that is capable of observing its environment, learning, 
and based on the knowledge and experience gained, taking intelligent action or proposing decisions’. This can 
include many technologies, with machine learning techniques being the most extensively used. For the purposes 
of this study, we use a similar broad definition.  
Box 1. Shaping Europe’s digital future  
‘The European Commission puts forward a European approach to Artificial Intelligence and Robotics. It deals with 
technological, ethical, legal and socio-economic aspects to boost EU's research and industrial capacity and to put AI at the 
service of European citizens and economy.’ 
‘Artificial intelligence (AI) has become an area of strategic importance and a key driver of economic development. It can 
bring solutions to many societal challenges from treating diseases to minimising the environmental impact of farming. 
However, socio-economic, legal and ethical impacts have to be carefully addressed.’ 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/artificial-intelligence  
The study 
The Commission report also highlights the need to improve our scientific understanding and develop transparent 
mechanisms to assess the quality and performance of AI, to ensure it serves the purpose of advancing society. 
Indeed, in terms of their effects on productivity, there is evidence that the adoption of digital technologies may 
be leading to a reduction in employment (Autor et al. 2020). If this were the case, AI may simply replace jobs 
without producing sufficient welfare gains.  
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To explore the impact of these technologies, this study analyses productivity gains that originate from firms 
that have patented AI technologies, to assess the growth potential of AI.  
In particular, we exploit a novel data set of AI patents at firm level, to analyse whether the extent to which 
firms adopt AI technologies positively affects productivity and wages. We also focus on 2 sectors – e-commerce 
and fintech – that are more extensively adopting AI and are growing rapidly, especially in terms of revenues 
(Kumar & Trakru, 2019).  
Stages in the study 
1. We collected firm-level data, combining 2 different sources: 
– AI and non-AI patent data, from Van Roy et al. (2019) 
– accounting data, from Orbis (Bureau van Dijk).  
 
2. We compared the average patented firm with e-commerce and fin-tech patented firms. Using a 
longitudinal dataset, we investigate both cross-sectional (between) and time-series (within) effects.  
 
3. We investigated whether the impact of AI innovation on total factor productivity also affects wage 
growth. 
Limitations 
This study represents a preliminary analysis, as we consider an objective measure of AI adoption that may be 
too restrictive, since it does not incorporate some less easily measurable technology adoption strategies. For 
example, some firms may be using AI applications without actually patenting or carrying out innovation 
themselves. So we may be underestimating how widespread use of AI is.  
While recognising these limitations, using AI patenting as a proxy for adoption nevertheless represents a valid 
starting point for assessing the future prospects of these technologies. 
Findings 
Our findings provide evidence that AI patents have an impact on both total factor productivity and wages at 
firm level. We find that firms who successfully obtain a greater number of AI patents tend to increase both 
their total factor productivity and wages.  
Thus, there is evidence that a greater number of AI patents is conducive to an increase in productivity, and that 
AI does not necessarily contribute to labour reduction and/or labour substitution by capital. It is true that, in 
many cases, AI contributes to labour reduction, but this is not the case according to our findings.  
In addition, we find that e-commerce and fintech firms, through granted AI patents, achieve total factor 
productivity gains that are closer to the technological frontier than non-e-commerce and non-fintech firms.  
Indeed, the higher productivity observed in these sectors, associated with a higher fraction of granted AI patents, 
remains if we also consider other firms belonging to finance and telecommunication industries. Our findings 
provide evidence for a ‘catching-up’ hypothesis – i.e., firms that are currently lagging behind are also most likely 
to intensely adopt productivity-boosting AI technologies.  
Policy implications 
These could include several options, such as facilitating AI technology adoption by firms currently on the cutting 
edge of productivity and encouraging more competitive environments and behaviour by firms.  
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This would offset some of the main forces associated with technological innovation that hinder growth – such 
as implementation lags, (Brynjolfsson et al. 2017) and reduction in aggregate demand (realised output) due to 
unemployment and reduced labour participation in the economy (Gries & Naudé, 2018).  
Incentivizing the licensing of AI technologies is an example of how to accelerate their spread without crowding 
out the innovation incentives of the firms that are catching up.  
Additionally, as other scholars have pointed out, there is a strong and clear call for better data. Good quality 
data allows for cross-regional analysis. Certainly, a common, shared definition of AI can help produce better 
data (Brundage et al., 2018), with the aim of designing policies that are more informed and solidly grounded 
on scientific evidence.  
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Findings (in detail) 
We show that: 
 Fintech and e-commerce, sectors that are more intensely adopting AI, also display higher levels of 
productivity.  
 AI impacts productivity beyond these specific sectors: firms that successfully obtain a greater 
number of AI patents tend to increase both their total factor productivity and wages.  
Thus, there is evidence that a greater number of AI patents is actually conducive to an increase in productivity.  
Nevertheless, we also find that on average firms that apply for and are granted AI patents are associated with 
lower TFP. We explore 2 possible alternative explanations: 
1. A ‘catching up’ hypothesis – based on the idea that firms investing in AI start off with a lower TFP 
compared to the average firm that patented in AI at least once since the year 2000, but successfully 
obtaining AI patents reduces the TFP gap.  
2. A ‘cost of investment’ hypothesis – implies that investing in AI involves a short-term reduction in 
TFP, but if the investment successfully produces AI patents, this increases TFP.  
Our analysis provides evidence that the catching up hypothesis is the most likely explanation.  
In terms of our main research question, this allows us to provide further insight on the central question of 
whether AI could represent a breakthrough technology. Our evidence shows that among the firms that patented 
AI technology, those that are developing and filing more AI patents are firms that were originally lagging behind 
the productivity leaders.  
Thus, according to our analysis, AI has not yet impacted the more productive firms. What remains to be seen is 
whether, once this catching up effect is completed, the competitive push will lead to pervasive spillovers across 
sectors that will produce a significant upward shift in productivity. 
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1 Introduction 
 
This study aims to assess the impact of AI patenting activities on total factor productivity (TFP) and wages.  
 
We collected firm-level data combining two different sources: 
 AI and non-AI patent data from Van Roy et al. (2020) 
 accounting data from Orbis (Bureau van Dijk).  
 
We then processed the data using ‘Tools for Innovation Monitoring’ (TIM), a series of analytic tools developed 
by the Joint Research Centre. 
 
We compared the average firm with firms in e-commerce and fin-tech – sectors we chose because they are 
extensively adopting artificial intelligence and showing extraordinary growth, especially in terms of revenues.  
 
The study contains 5 sections:  
- literature review 
- business descriptive statistics with AI patent activities 
- the effect on TFP and average wage structure 
- policy implications  
- conclusions. 
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2  Literature review 
This literature review first highlights that a very long-term trend of economic and productivity decline, put 
preassure on firms developing AI technologies and solutions to revert the trend, as was the case of other 
‘general purpose technologies’ in the past. It then explores how previous investigations analysed AI innovations 
and their effects on productivity and wages of firms, in general, and in ecommerce and fintech in particular. 
 
2.1 AI as a general purpose technology – effects on productivity and wages  
Many scholars, analysts, consultancies and advocacy groups argue that AI might be at the helm of the current 
era of innovation. It is said that the capacity of AI is such that – with minimal or even no human intervention – 
it is possible to control natural, social and production processes, and so generate large productivity gains (Grinin, 
Korotayev, & Tausch, 2016). 
Such statements create expectations about the capacity of AI to reduce employment vulnerability and increase 
productivity, employment and per capita income (Aly, 2020). Although there are fears of job displacement, the 
job creation and welfare gains are expected to offset these losses at industry and aggregate levels (Khatri, 
Pandey, & Penkar, 2020).   
AI may help firms able to re-combine knowledge production (Agrawal, McHale, & Oettl, 2018), and may benefit 
the economy, providing human-enhancing AI innovations offset human-replacing AI innovations (Trajtenberg, 
2018). Net positive gains in human-enhancing AI are possible because the presence of routine tasks in a job (a 
factor claimed to lead to automating jobs out of existence), is not the sole factor determining the possibility of 
overall job automation and displacement (Bissessur, Arabikhan, & Bednar, 2020). 
AI can be classed as general purpose technologies because:  
1) it has many application areas – computing, health, manufacturing, transportation, smart cities and grids, 
nanotechnology, agriculture, financial services, marketing and ecommerce, waste management, education, 
cybersecurity, telecommunications, etc.;  
2) it requires large stocks of tangible, intangible, and complementary capital (Brynjolfsson, Rock, & Syverson, 
2017) and a substantial amount of time to correctly identify, produce and put together knowledge and 
resources (Brynjolfsson et al., 2017);  
3) the coordination of multiple elements during the innovation processes within and across firms is what 
might enable AI to lead to productivity gains (Bresnahan & Trajtenberg, 1995). This means that if AI as general 
purpose technologies is not reflected in the productivity statistics, this is because firms still need time to 
coordinate innovations. 
Funk (2020) states that, in terms of their effects on productivity gains, AI innovations are more evolutionary 
and incremental in nature than revolutionary and disruptive. He bases his statements on observing various AI 
applications:  
- sales and marketing – applying AI is a zero-sum game, as it shifts customers from one competitor 
to other, without significantly increasing demand;  
- human-resource management – AI modestly increases productivity, but not as much as process 
automation;  
- generative designs– AI is not developed or diffused enough in terms of number and size of firms 
to have noticeable productivity impacts;  
- computing hardware and software – a noticeable machine learning productivity is still years 
away (Funk, 2020).  
Brynjolfsson et al. (2017) emphasise the presence of a modern productivity paradox characterised by declining 
TFP, even after the spread of AI, that can be explained by false hopes, implementation lags, redistribution of 
wealth through creative destruction (i.e. only few firms reap the benefits of AI), and inaccurate measurement, 
e.g. intangible assets already captured in firms’ market values, but not measured by analysts.  
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This is a problem, because reduced productivity slows market growth and reduces the attractiveness of 
financing future rounds of improvements, in turn further reducing productivity, and so on (Thompson & Spanuth, 
2018).  
At micro (industry) and macro (economy-wide) level, the timespan for seeing AI productivity growth remains 
unclear. Valenduc (2018) expects the productivity effects of AI, like previous general purpose technologies, to 
be measured in decades rather than in years. Moreover, Storm (2019) does not expect AI to show larger 
productivity effects than previous general purpose technologies, because markets and the economy in general 
are less favourable now than before (Storm, 2019). For instance, in the US, there was a decline in FTP growth 
from 0.49 to 0.41 from the 1970s to the 2010s (Fernald, 2016). 
Furthermore, Schmelzing (2020) predicts continued long-term decline in growth and productivity, where 
innovations (such as AI) are just palliatives, which explains why scholars propose saving humanity from a related 
Malthusian destiny by introducing social safety nets (Korinek & Stiglitz, 2017). 
The next sections discuss the possible effects of innovations and patenting on the productivity of the firm, and 
whether AI patenting, and AI in the e-commerce and fintech firms that implement it, are expected to exhibit 
higher productivity than the average innovative firm.  
 
2.2 Innovation and productivity 
Despite the long-term decline in productivity and growth, there are firms, and even whole industries that have 
seen productivity growth after they implemented innovations. For instance, Turkish banks after the 1980s 
introduced innovations that induced efficiencies and saw substantial TFP growth (Isik & Kabir Hassan, 2003). 
Similarly, Eastern European banks’ TFP grew during the global financial crisis (2007-8) catching-up with the 
declining TFP of their Western European counterparts, who showed lagging efficiency and technological 
regression (Degl’Innocenti, Kourtzidis, Sevic, & Tzeremes, 2017). 
Malaysia’s non-banking financial sector implemented innovations leading to substantial TFP growth, although 
this was more evident in large financial institutions (Sufian, 2008; Sufian & Habibullah, 2009). During trade 
liberalisation in Bangladesh, its manufacturing sector experienced TFP growth from 1993 to 1998, with export-
oriented firms performing better than import-oriented ones (Hassan, Isik, & Mamun, 2010). It was shown that 
productivity (sales) increased in India’s pharmaceutical industry thanks to firms’ R&D and patenting activities 
(Pannu, Kumar, & Farooquie, 2010).  
At country level, there are indications that high-tech innovation has a very low effect on TFP, and high-tech 
entrepreneurship has a U-shape relationship with TFP (El Ghak, Gdairia, & Abassi, 2020). The hypothesis put 
forward by the authors is that innovation based on digital (ICT) technologies is not as useful as innovations 
from previous technological revolutions, because it does not induce profound changes in production and 
consumption at the same time. However, after the bottom inflection point, increased entrepreneurship improves 
TFP (El Ghak et al., 2020). Similar findings are presented in a meta-analysis of the ICT productivity paradox 
(Polák, 2017), in which ICT is shown to have very little effect on productivity. The same study shows that 
previous studies trying to debunk the ICT productivity paradox tend to have strong research biases (Polák, 2017). 
At firm level, an analysis by Huergo & Moreno (2011) shows that company growth and productivity have been 
associated with innovation outputs more than innovation inputs. Their model assessed TFP depending on 
technological outputs (innovations), and outputs depending on technological inputs (R&D), i.e. a Crepon Duguet 
Mairesse model. With panel data from the Spanish Community Innovation Survey, they show how, for innovation 
to have a long-term effect on TFP, R&D investment needs to be persistent over time. 
The innovation and productivity relationship in a study of Dutch and French manufacturing companies showed 
that, to varying degrees between countries, innovations have lasting effects on labour productivity. In this case 
however, there was no need for persistent innovation (Raymond, Mairesse, Mohnen, & Palm, 2015). 
An analysis of Italian firms observed from 1996 to 2005, using a general method of moments (GMM) with 
regional and sectoral controls, shows that complexity and innovation carried through local interactions lead to 
strong TFP growth (Antonelli & Scellato, 2013). Another company-level analysis, with a fully modified ordinary 
least squares (FMOLS) model, showed that embodied, disembodied, and R&D intensities have positive impacts 
on the TFP of Indian manufacturing firms (Satpathy, Chatterjee, & Mahakud, 2017). 
In sum, innovations have shown various degrees of effects on productivity, both low and high, and the 
relationship might not always be linear. Therefore, the next section focuses on a particular type of innovation – 
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patents. These are innovation outputs, which are claimed to be a specific measure of innovation, related to 
knowledge – both codified knowledge (patents) and the stock of knowledge (patents stock). 
 
2.3 Patenting and productivity 
Patents are not a perfect measure of innovation, because applications focus on differentiating the patent from 
pre-existing knowledge, rather than future market potential (Leydesdorff, Rotolo, & de Nooy, 2013). However, 
venture capitalists and risk capital investors make their decisions to invest in patenting based on expected 
future profitability (Santos & Qin, 2019). Nevertheless, it needs to be acknowledged that filing patents does not 
require working prototypes, nor even the intention of making them (Brennen, Howard, & Nielsen, 2018). 
Having said that, an analysis of Pakistan’s patenting activities using the multivariate generalized autoregressive 
conditionally heteroskedastic–Baba, Engle, Kraft and Kroner (GARCH–BEKK) model, showed that innovations set 
out in filed patents have a long-term positive effect on TFP, as long as there is also an expansion of skilled 
labour employed in the country (Mumtaz & Smith, 2017).  
Also at company level, using patent data and R&D intensities from US Census microdata, Acemoglu et al. (2018) 
showed not only that patenting and R&D improve productivity in the firm, but also, by freeing up skilled labour 
and specialised resources from firms that exit the market and probably reallocating them to ‘high type 
incumbents’, it generates broader industrial and economic gains. 
At industry level, Giovanis & Ozdamar (2015), using general method of moments (GMM), showed how the 
technological relevance of US companies’ patents have positive effects on TFP, both during economic recessions 
and periods of economic growth. However, the effect is stronger during recessions, and the effect and 
significance are actually very low during growth periods.  
As regards economic recession, interestingly, in the post-war period the Japanese Patenting System allowed 
firms to file multiple patents in very narrow areas of applications, to help firms experiencing economic 
difficulties to catch up through incremental innovation. The Japanese Patenting System achieved this objective, 
with substantial impacts on TFP (Maskus & McDaniel, 1999). 
The Schumpeterian view of innovation during recessions – or ‘creative destruction’ phases – is that for 
companies to be competitive, they need to free up and reallocate resources to the most efficient and productive 
areas of the firm.  
However, an analysis of US manufacturing firms that file patents showed that this is not the case: neither 
resources nor market power were necessary for patenting to lead to increased TFP for US manufacturing firms, 
rather just competitive behaviour. 
This is because firms with greater resources (indicating that they have monopoly power, or are in sectors with 
high market concentration) do not have the same level of incentives (measured by the differential between 
current and expected future profits) to innovate and patent for growth. Firms in more competitive markets have 
higher incentives (Correa & Ornaghi, 2014).  
Patents are acknowledged as a reliable measure of innovation, and they have been shown to have a relationship 
with productivity. Christiansen (2008) shows that both R&D investment (inputs) and patents (outputs) show 
similar effects on labour productivity for manufacturing industries in OECD countries. Romero & Britto (2015) 
discovered similar results by measuring the effects on TFP; addressing unobserved effects, measurement errors, 
and endogeneity with a System GMM model (Romero & Britto, 2015).  
Patents are widely used as measure of innovation, or as outputs of R&D activities (Patel & Pavitt, 1987). And 
patents granted reflect the firm’s capacity to generate change and improve an area of technology, even though 
it can be unclear, at the time the patent is granted, whether it will in fact be useful for the firm (Robertson & 
Patel, 2007).  
 
2.4 AI patenting, productivity and wages 
The effects of AI patents on productivity can vary over time and according to the area of patent application. A 
study of AI patenting in China from 2002 to 2016 focused on finding productivity effects in the early stages of 
AI patenting that improved the quality and speed of pattern recognition. It then moved on to examine 
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improvements in real time monitoring and virtual reality, and, later AI patents focused on Internet of Things, 
image identification and cloud systems (Huang, Miao, Zhang, Yu, & Wang, 2017).  
Thus, one cannot expect AI to have same effects on company performance in all areas of application. Moreover, 
although China is a large producer of AI patents, the US, Japan, and Korea are close competitors; and the lead 
is with the US – not in terms of number of patents but in terms of value they generate (Yang & Yu, 2019).  
The biggest AI classes in the USPTO from 2008 to 2018 were: electric digital data processing; automatic data 
recognition and handling; digital information transmission; data processing for commercial, financial, 
forecasting and other purposes, among others (Abadi & Pecht, 2020).  
Whether AI patents may have value for the firm might not be important when a study is looking at AI patents 
effects on labour productivity. However, it is relevant when productivity is measured with TFP, as this measure 
is based on the “real value” that the firm adds.  
A study by Benassi et al. (2020) shows that AI patents have significant effects on TFP. The study analysed firm- 
level data (global ORBIS-IP firms database from 2009 to 2014) with OLS and fixed effects regressions, focusing 
on 4th industrial revolution (4IR) patents (e.g. artificial intelligence, cloud computing, networked sensors, 5G 
networks, 3D systems, smart manufacturing, etc.). It showed positive effects on TFP.  
A similar analysis of 4IR patents and performance extracted from Orbis-IP, and analysed with a SYS GMM, 
showed that firms located in OECD countries patenting in 4IR areas (including AI) tend to increase their wages 
(Li, Shi, & Fu, 2020), which according to the authors is due to rent sharing effects derived from the benefits of 
patent exploitation, as discussed in other research (Kline, Petkova, Williams, & Zidar, 2019).  
In fact, the gains from patenting may even start before patent applications, and can continue after, at all levels 
of the firms, i.e. for inventors, co-workers, blue and white-collars, and shareholders; at least as shown by 
evidence of Finnish firms applying for patents to the European Patent Office (Aghion, Akcigit, Hyytinen, & 
Toivanen, 2018).  
The theory that resources are reallocated to ‘high type incumbents’, as discussed in the previous section, is 
reinforced in a study at industry level, in which Autor & Salomons (2018) looked at the EU KLEMS data for 1970 
to 2007, and concluded AI patenting had positive effects on TFP.  
And while the industries concerned experienced short-term resource and employment losses, the study proved, 
using the World Input-Output Database (WIOD), that industries with TFP growth reallocate employment and 
resources throughout input-output linkages, stimulate aggregate demand, and spread general TFP gains to 
associated industries.  
The study also showed that weak input-output linkages, or those that contribute little to value added, will not 
spread effects (either positive or negative) to the rest of the economy, but rather will tend to remain within the 
industry that experiences the direct effect.  
At country level, an analysis from 1990 to 2014 showed that AI patenting contributed to TFP: by 8% in OECD 
countries, by 11% in the EU, and by 34% in the US (Venturini, 2019).  
In sum, the literature suggests that AI patenting may drive labour productivity, and that 4IR patents may drive 
wage growth. What remains to examine is whether AI patenting leads to TFP and wage improvements at firm 
level. Our hypothesis that is does. 
 
2.5 AI in fintech and e-commerce 
The two industries poised to invest highly in AI in the future are banking and retail (i.e. e-commerce) (Mou, 
2019).  
For instance, Soni et al. (2020) show that of a sample of global AI start-ups in 2017 and 2018, commerce 
applications increased from 1% of the total start-ups in 2017 to 5% of the total in 2018; whilst fintech and 
insurance increased from 4% to 5% in the same period.  
This might explain why intelligent finance and intelligent e-commerce (the application of AI technologies in 
finance and e-commerce) are growing rapidly, with e-commerce expected to be worth USD 4.8 trillion in 2021 
(Jiao, 2018). Fintech means technological instruments developed to meet users’ financial needs and demands, 
with the most popular development being automated or assisted management of investments by means of AI 
(Belanche, Casaló, & Flavián, 2019). 
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Patenting activity in intelligent finance grew substantially from 2011, topped by China and the US, but with the 
US leading in terms of R&D capacity (HE, DU, & QIAO, 2020). Patenting in e-commerce is led by the US and 
China – Amazon and Alibaba, respectively. For these 2 giants, alongside AI use in directed e-commerce 
advertising, the most important patenting activity is associated with computational systems extracting big data 
information to predict business behaviour (Trappey, Trappey, Wang, & Hsieh, 2018). 
Whether AI patenting in fintech and e-commerce increase firms’ TFP is an analysis still missing in the literature. 
This is the main contributing focus of this report. 
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3 Empirical section  
3.1 A look at firms with AI patenting activities1  
 
This section examines – in the 2010-16 period – 8,820 firms that had made at least one AI patent application 
since 2000.  
The aim is to sketch the distribution of firms, patenting activities and total factor productivity by country and 
sector – to see whether the countries with highest AI patenting activities are also those with the highest total 
factor productivity, and/or vice versa.  
The comparisons rely on data availability (for any country not represented, this is because of missing data). 
We collected firm-level data from two different sources: 
 AI and non-AI patent data from Van Roy et al. (2020) 
 accounting data from Orbis (Bureau van Dijk).  
Van Roy et al. (2020) classify patent data using the PATSTAT database from the European Patent Office, 
containing data from over 90 patent authorities, concerning the main patenting countries. The patent documents 
are divided into different groups (with a necessary condition for forming a group being that at least one of 
them is in English). The data was processed using Tools for Innovation Monitoring (TIM), a series of analytic 
tools developed by the JRC.  
To identify AI and non-AI technologies, Van Roy et al. (2020) adopt a keyword-based search. More specifically, 
to qualify as an AI patent, a document must have some specific terms in the title, abstract, or project (e.g., EC, 
2018; Del Prato et al., 2018). The list of these terms is based on previous scientific literature and can be found 
in Van Roy et al. (2020).  
As mentioned above, accounting data come from Orbis. This dataset collects information on more than 375 
million companies and organizations across the globe. However, since patent data refers only to firms who 
made at least one AI patent application in the period 2000–16 (Van Roy et al., 2020), and a large number of 
observations have missing values in accounting data, the sample used in this section consists of 8,820 
observations.  
In this section, we compare firm-level data by country and sector, and in particular we draw attention to e-
commerce and financial services firms.  
To identify e-commerce activities, we follow the definition suggested by the Voorburg Group2 which includes 
members of several National Statistics Offices, such as Canada, Mexico, Chile, Italy and the US. The Voorburg 
definition takes into account the definition by the OECD in its Guide to Measuring the Information Society (Beth 
et al., 2018).  
To identify the firms providing e-commerce services, we use the NACE classification3, NACE 4-digit 4791 6311 
6312; to identify the firms with financial technologies, we use NACE 2-digit 64 65 66. 
The countries included are as follows: the EU with 27 Member States, the US, South Korea, China, Japan and 
the Rest of the World4.  
                                          
1 Our sample includes firms with at least one AI patent since 2000 
2 The Voorburg Group includes: Mary Beth Garneau et al (Statistics Canada), Erika Barrera (Central Bank of Chile), John Murphy and Andrew 
Baer (US Census Bureau), Ramon Bravo (INEGI Mexico), Cristina Cecconi, Roberta Cacciaglia, Fabiana Cecconi (Istat, Italy).  
 
3
 E-commerce NACE 4-digit: Retail trade 4791, Commerce de detail: Retail trade is defined in the International Standard Industrial 
Classification (ISIC) as the re-sale (sale without transformation) of new and used goods to the general public, for personal or household 
consumption or utilization; Data processing, hosting, and related services 6311; Internet publishing and broadcasting, and web search 
portals, 6312 (Beth et al., 2018). And, Fintech NACE 2-digit: Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding, 64; Insurance, 
reinsurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security, 65; Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities, 66 
 
4 28 countries, covering the 5 continents: United Arab Emirates (the), Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Belarus, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, Hong 
Kong, Israel, India, Iceland, Cayman Islands, Liechtenstein, Moldova, Mexico, Malaysia, Norway, New Zealand, Qatar, Serbia, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Vietnam.  
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The total factor productivity is built on 3 variables: value-added, working capital per employee, and number of 
employees.  
Since both the value-added and the working capital are expressed in nominal terms, we use the Consumer Price 
Index (2010=100) from the World Bank as a deflator.5  
The situation is illustrated by 3 groups of charts below: 
 distribution and share of firms with patenting activities, by country and sector; 
 distribution of AI patent stock (applications and granted patents);  
 total factor productivity averages. 
 
3.1.1 Distribution and share of firms with AI patenting activities 
Figure 1. Share of firms by country 
                                 
Sources: created by the authors and including both patent and financial data, from Van Roy et al. (2020). This database is a combination 
of the patents extracted from Orbis Patents and Bureau Van Dijk’s Orbis database, using the EC TIM text-mining tool.  
 
Figure 2. Distribution of firms by sector 
E-commerce and financial technologies account for 223 firms, approximately 2.5% of the total. 
 
Sources: created by the authors and including both patent and financial data, from Van Roy et al. (2020). This database is a combination 
of the patents extracted from Orbis Patents and Bureau Van Dijk’s Orbis database, using the EC TIM text-mining tool.  
Notes: total number of firms 8,820; e-commerce includes firms belonging to 4-digit NACE 4791 6311 6312; fintech includes firms 
belonging to 2-digit NACE 64 65 66. E-commerce is not a sector per se, since it covers a wide range of activities. 
                                          
 
5 We used the CPI to deflate the working capital, as in McGouldrick (1968). 
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Figure 3. Share of firms by e-commerce, fintech and ICT 
           
 
Figure 4. Share of e-commerce & fintech firms, by country 
 
Sources: created by the authors and including both patent and financial data, from Van Roy et al. (2020). This database is a combination 
of the patents extracted from Orbis Patents and Bureau Van Dijk’s Orbis database, using the EC TIM text-mining tool.  
Notes: total number of firms 8,820; e-commerce includes firms belonging to 4-digit NACE 4791 6311 6312; fintech includes firms 
belonging to 2-digit NACE 64 65 66. E-commerce is not a sector per se, since it covers a wide range of activities. 
 
3.1.2 Distribution of AI patent stocks: applications and granted patents 
Figure 5 shows that the highest number of AI patent applications and stocks of granted patents from 2010 to 
2016 were held by Korea, China, Japan and the US. 
All countries saw increasing trends in their stock of applications, especially in 2016 (except the EU in 2010). As 
regards patents grant, stocks were on an increasing trend in the US and China, decreasing in Japan, Korea, the 
EU.  
In 2016, rates of successful application were 37% in the US, 32% in the EU, 24% in South Korea, 23% in Japan, 
18% in Korea and 15% in the rest of the world.  
Overall, the stock of granted patents for AI represents about 1% of all granted patents.  
 
Figure 5. AI patent stocks, by country (applications and granted patents) 
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Figure 6. AI patent stocks (applications and granted patents) by country – e-commerce and fintech 
 
 
Sources: created by the authors and including both patent and financial data, from Van Roy et al. (2020). This database is a combination 
of the patents extracted from Orbis Patents and Bureau Van Dijk’s Orbis database, using the EC TIM text-mining tool.  
Notes: total number of firms 8,820; e-commerce includes firms belonging to 4-digit NACE 4791 6311 6312; fintech includes firms 
belonging to 2-digit NACE 64 65 66. E-commerce is not a sector per se, since it covers a wide range of activities. 
 
3.1.3 Total factor productivity (TFP), firm level comparisons by country 
 
Figure 7 shows the trend in total factor productivity by country from 2010 to 2016.  
The EU saw the highest TFP averages between 2010 and 2016, followed by the Rest of the World. Overall, each 
region shows ups and downs, with falling productivity in 2016 (except Japan, with its rising pattern since 2012).  
Firms providing e-commerce and fintech services have higher TFP in the EU and Korea (with Korea in particular 
starting a steep rise in 2015).  
E-commerce and fintech firms with the highest TFP are in the EU and Korea (followed by the US and the Rest 
of the World).  
Figure 8 shows the average TFP gap – the difference between the average TFP of all sectors and the average 
of TFP of e-commerce and fintech firms.  
The gap widened remarkably in Korea and the Rest of the world between 2010 and 2016.  
The left side of the chart shows the negative TFP gap – average TFP of e-commerce and fintech firms is 
higher than the average of other sectors.  
The right side of the chart shows the positive TFP gap – where average TFP in all sectors is higher than e-
commerce and fintech firms.  
Firms running e-commerce and fintech businesses on average record a greater productivity in Korea, the EU 
and the US (only in 2016), compared to the RoW.  
 
This section has shown that, according to our sample of firms: 
 the highest stocks of granted AI patents in 2010-16 were (in descending order) in Japan, Korea 
and China, followed by the US, EU27 and the Rest of the World.  
 the top 3 in AI patent applications were Japan, China and Korea.  
 in total factor productivity, the top 10 countries are the EU27, Rest of the World and Korea, 
followed by China, Japan and US.  
 firms providing e-commerce and fintech services have higher TFP than other sectors in Korea, the 
EU and the US. The Rest of the world shows the opposite trend – firms in other sectors have higher 
TFP.  
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Figure 7. TFP, all sectors, and TFP for e-commerce and financial firms, 2010-20166 
 
 
Sources: created by the authors and including both patent and financial data, from Van Roy et al. (2020). This database is a combination 
of the patents extracted from Orbis Patents and Bureau Van Dijk’s Orbis database, using the EC TIM text-mining tool.  
Notes: total number of firms 8,820; e-commerce includes firms belonging to 4-digit NACE 4791 6311 6312; fintech includes firms 
belonging to 2-digit NACE 64 65 66. E-commerce is not a sector per se, since it covers a wide range of activities. China and Japan data are 
missing.  
 
 
Figure 8. Total factor productivity – average gap 
 
 
Sources: created by the authors and including both patent and financial data, from Van Roy et al. (2020). This database is a combination 
of the patents extracted from Orbis Patents and Bureau Van Dijk’s Orbis database, using the EC TIM text-mining tool.  
Notes: total number of firms 8,820; e-commerce includes firms belonging to 4-digit NACE 4791 6311 6312; fintech includes firms 
belonging to 2-digit NACE 64 65 66. E-commerce is not a sector per se, since it covers a wide range of activities. China and Japan data are 
missing.  
 
 
The next empirical section focuses on AI patenting and its effect on TFP and wages. 
 
                                          
6 Data missing for China and Japan, and partially missing for the US.  
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3.2 AI patenting – effect on TFP and average wage structure 
3.2.1 Data 
We used the data described in the patenting activity section 3.1. In the present section the final sample consists 
of 6,617 observations7, ending with an unbalanced panel of 1,738 companies observed over the period 2010-
2016.  
To limit information loss, we only use those accounting variables that are relevant for the production function 
and necessary to calculate a measure of TFP: 
 value-added 
 working capital per employee 
 number of employees.  
Since both value-added and working capital are expressed in nominal terms, we use the Consumer Price Index 
(2010=100) from the World Bank as a deflator.  
Table 1 shows the main descriptive statistics. Notice that the real value-added (RVA), the stock of capital (K), 
and the input of labour have been log-transformed. All have a right-skewed distribution, with means greater 
than medians.  
Moreover, as expected, the average number of patent applications is always higher than the number of granted 
patents. On average, our firms make 0.587 AI applications per year, but only 0.192 earn a grant. The average 
stock of granted AI patents is 1.187 per firm, whereas non-AI patents are much more frequent.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics (N=6,617) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min 1st qrt. Median 3rd qrt. Max 
Ln(RVA) 5.171 2.979 -6.571 2.882 4.800 7.288 13.418 
Ln(L) 5.735 2.629 0.000 3.784 5.323 7.502 14.648 
Ln(K) 4.762 2.916 -6.914 2.728 4.533 6.832 12.481 
AI patent app. 0.587 5.266 0 0 0 0 241 
AI patent granted 0.192 1.624 0 0 0 0 61 
AI patent granted stock 1.187 8.557 0 0 0 0.614 278 
Non-AI patent app. 57.961 337.112 0 0 2 13 5869 
Non-AI patent granted 31.453 201.141 0 0 1 7 4108 
Non-AI patent granted stock 203.368 1186.462 0 2 8 54.543 25,906 
Notes: This table shows the main descriptive statistics for the variables used in analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
7 Whilst in section 3.1 we use 8,820 observations, the use of lower number of observations of this second empirical section is due to the 
GMM analysis: firstly, because we use only those observations that simultaneously have no missing values in the determinants and in the 
covariates; secondly, because the GMM approach is based on lagged variables, and the observations at the beginning of the period are lost. 
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3.2.2 Methodology 
This study examines the relationship between patents (applications and granted patents) in AI innovation and 
firms' TFP.8  
Using a longitudinal dataset (and terminology from Bell et al. (2018)), we investigate both cross-sectional 
(between) and time-series (within) effects:  
 ‘between’ effect – this will tell us how time-invariant characteristics (such as sectoral differences or 
average degree of innovation) affect TFP.  
 ‘within’ effect – by contrast, this will allow us to understand whether investing in AI innovation is 
rewarding for a firm, controlling for time-invariant heterogeneity. 
The departure point for both analyses is the following Cobb-Douglas production function: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑞𝐴(𝑋𝑖𝑡)𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝛼𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝛽
𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,                                                             (1) 
Where: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the real value added of firm i at time t 
 𝑞 is a constant parameter 
 𝐴(𝑋𝑖𝑡) represents the ex-ante unknown TFP measure 
 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of TFP determinants 
 𝐾𝑖𝑡 is the capital stock 
 𝐿𝑖𝑡 is the labour input  
 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 
 
Estimating the ‘between effects’ 
This part of the analysis is based on a 2-step procedure: 
 step 1 – deriving a reliable measure of TFP. To do so, we follow a consolidated procedure that is 
described in Appendix B.  
 step 2 – having obtained this measure of TFP, we use a Correlated Random Effect (CRE) estimator 
to separate cross-sectional and longitudinal components from the data.9  
Mundlak (1978) shows that adding individual means for the independent variables represents an effective way 
to relax the assumption in the random-effects estimator that the observed variables are uncorrelated with the 
unobserved variables (see also Wooldridge, 2010; Greene, 2011).  
The main advantage of this approach with respect to a standard fixed effect estimator is the possibility to 
estimate the impact of time-invariant characteristics such as sectoral differences by controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity.  
Formally, we estimate the following transformed Mundlak’s model: 
ln(𝐴𝑖𝑡) = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑤(𝑋𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖) + 𝛾1𝐵?̅?𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑍𝑖 + (𝜍𝑖 + 𝜐𝑖𝑡),                                  (2) 
                                          
8 Although AI innovation does not necessarily imply that firms are adopting the innovation, the sectoral composition of our sample indicates 
that many firms are producing innovation internally rather than selling it. Indeed, only a small fraction of our sample refers to sectors 
typically involved in ICT development.  
9   The empirical findings presented here are based on Wooldridge’s (2009) methodology; however, results do not qualitatively change with 
the other two measures.  
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where: 
 𝛾1𝑤 is the within effect 
 𝛾1𝐵 is the between effect 
 𝑍𝑖 is a set of time-invariant characteristics 
 𝜍𝑖 + 𝜐𝑖𝑡 is a composite error term.  
Whereas the interpretation of the within estimator, 𝛾1𝑤, is rather straightforward, since it indicates the marginal 
impact of a unit increase in the independent variable on TFP, the interpretation of the between effect, 𝛾1𝐵, is 
slightly more difficult.  
The between coefficient answers the following question: what is the effect of changing the level of ?̅?𝑖 , without 
keeping the level of 𝑋𝑖𝑡 constant?  
In terms of patents, the between effect can also be interpreted as the benefit (cost) of experiencing a unitary 
increase in the average number of patents, keeping the current absolute deviation constant. Indeed, for any 
given 𝑋𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖 , an increase in ?̅?𝑖 implies that we are moving the firm to a higher innovation pattern.  
The between effect also represents the bias we would observe in a pooled-OLS regression that does not consider 
the firm’s average AI performance. If the estimated coefficients of the individual means are statistically 
significant, then unobserved heterogeneity is likely correlated with observed variables, and the Mundlak 
correction is appropriate. 
 
Estimating the within effect 
Although Equation (2) already contains a full set of within effects, because of time-varying endogeneity, these 
coefficients can continue to be biased. Time-varying endogeneity may be related to the fact that more profitable 
firms have more resources to invest in innovation (reverse causality), or more in general it can arise from the 
omission of important time-varying controls. 
Therefore, we use a system GMM estimator to address this issue and properly evaluate the within effects. This 
approach is appropriate when simultaneity or reverse causality problems can bias the estimates and there are 
no valid instrumental variables.  
To be consistent with the existing literature on firm-level TFP computation (e.g., Olley and Pakes, 1996; 
Levinshon and Petrin, 2003; Wooldridge, 2009), we log-linearize Equation (1) and estimate the following model: 
𝑙𝑛(𝑌𝑖𝑡) = 𝑙𝑛(𝐴𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼𝑡𝑙𝑛(𝐾𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽𝑡𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑖𝑡) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡,                        (3) 
where 𝑙𝑛(𝐴𝑖𝑡) = 𝛾1𝑤𝑋𝑖𝑡 . Now, the coefficient 𝛾1𝑤 represents the causal impact of a unitary increase in 𝑋𝑖𝑡 on 
𝑙𝑛(𝑌𝑖𝑡). In particular, we are interested in the impact of AI patenting on firms’ TFP. 
We conclude the analysis by investigating whether the impact of AI innovation on TFP also affects wage growth. 
More specifically, we re-estimate Equation (3), replacing the TFP measure with wage growth and adding the 
past level of wages, to account for the fact that firms already paying higher wages may exhibit lower growth 
rates of wages.  
 
3.2.3 Results 
Productivity and AI innovation in e-commerce and fintech sectors 
We start the analysis testing whether e-commerce and fintech differ from other sectors in terms of productivity 
and innovation. Using a simple t-test, Table 2 shows that, on average, firms belonging to the e-commerce or 
fintech sector exhibit higher productivity levels (independently of the TFP measure we consider) and higher AI 
innovation.  
In this respect, e-commerce and fintech firms are twice as innovative as other firms. By contrast, e-commerce 
and fintech firms own a lower stock of non-AI patents than other firms. This descriptive evidence reveals that 
specific service sectors may drive AI innovation.  
23 
Table 2. T-test for e-commerce & fintech sectors 
 Non e-commerce & fintech E-commerce & fintech p-value 
TFP -0.451 -0.123 0.001 
AI patent app. 0.673 1.156 0.000 
AI patent granted 0.231 0.300 0.084 
Patent app. 40.534 28.865 0.042 
Patent granted 22.953 16.246 0.040 
AI patent granted stock 1.404 1.170 0.160 
Patent granted stock 144.250 49.719 0.000 
Notes: T-test results contrasting e-commerce & fintech sectors against other sectors in terms of productivity 
and patents. 
 
AI innovation and TFP: sectoral differences 
Table 3 provides the OLS and CRE estimates obtained from Equation (2). Columns 1-3 report the coefficients 
of pooled-OLS regressions, when we consider patent applications, granted patents, and the granted stock of 
patents, respectively.  
According to our estimates, if we do not control for any source of endogeneity, we would conclude that there is 
a negative relationship between AI innovation and TFP. However, Columns 4-6 show that this negative 
correlation is due to time-invariant heterogeneity associated with firms’ average innovative performance. This 
means that we cannot interpret OLS coefficients in terms of causal impact of AI innovation on TFP.  
Indeed, when we consider the average number of AI granted patents and the average stock of AI patents, the 
between effect of AI patents is negative and statistically significant. We can formulate two alternative 
hypotheses explaining this result: 
 the first hypothesis goes from AI patents to TFP and refers to the possibility that keeping high levels 
of AI innovation is costly and these costs are reflected in a lower productivity (cost hypothesis).  
 the second hypothesis goes from TFP to AI innovation and is related to the possibility that less 
productive firms invest in AI innovation to catch up with more productive companies (catching-up 
hypothesis).  
In line with the t-test results, Table 3 also shows a positive coefficient of the average number of granted AI 
patents in the e-commerce and fintech sectors. Indeed, the higher productivity observed in these sectors is 
associated with a higher fraction of granted AI patents. These results remain consistent if, together with e-
commerce and fintech firms, we consider other firms belonging to the finance and telecommunication 
industries. 
 
Table 3. AI innovation and TFP (OLS and CRE models) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS CRE 
Patents  Applications Granted Granted stock Applications Granted Granted stock 
AI patent (w) -0.005** -0.028*** -0.008*** 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.005) 
Patent (w) -0.000 0.000 0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AI patent (b)    -0.009 -0.054** -0.012** 
    (0.007) (0.024) (0.005) 
Patent (b)    0.000 0.000 0.000* 
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    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fintech & e-com 0.333** 0.332** 0.333** 0.862*** 0.858*** 0.859*** 
 (0.163) (0.162) (0.162) (0.194) (0.194) (0.194) 
IMR (w) -0.482*** -0.465*** -0.425*** 0.014 0.010 0.010 
 (0.167) (0.160) (0.165) (0.152) (0.152) (0.152) 
IMR (b)    -0.389 -0.371 -0.330 
    (0.256) (0.254) (0.255) 
Intercept -0.154 -0.164* -0.189* -0.263 -0.273* -0.299* 
 (0.103) (0.099) (0.102) (0.161) (0.159) (0.160) 
N 6617 6617 6617 6617 6617 6617 
RMSE 0.841 0.841 0.841 0.441 0.441 0.441 
R2 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.005 
R2 (w)    0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 (b)    0.015 0.017 0.017 
Notes: This table shows the OLS and CRE coefficients of Equation (2).  
Columns 1 and 4 consider the number of patent applications as main explanatory variables.  
Columns 2 and 5 replace these variables with the number of granted patents. 
Columns 3 and 6 employ the number of granted patents stock.  
IMR stands for Inverse Mills Ratio and serves to control for sample selection problems.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance: *p<10%, **p<5%, ***p<1%. 
 
To test the catching-up hypothesis, we included in Equation (2) the firm’s initial value for TFP. This strategy is 
common in economic growth literature, to test the absolute convergence hypothesis (see, e.g., Islam, 1995).  
Table 4 shows that, once we control for the initial TFP level, the between effect of AI on TFP disappears. This 
evidence supports the catching-up hypothesis; that is, less productive firms invest more in AI technologies to 
recover from their initial productivity gap. 
 
Table 4. AI innovation and TFP (OLS and CRE models with initial TFP) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS CRE 
Patents  Applications Granted Granted stock Applications Granted Granted stock 
AI patent (w) 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.005) 
Patent (w) -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AI patent (b)    -0.000 -0.004 0.000 
    (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) 
Patent (b)    -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fintech & e-com 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.023 0.024 0.024 
 (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140) 
IMR (w) -0.252** -0.238** -0.242** 0.098 0.102 0.098 
 (0.107) (0.100) (0.106) (0.157) (0.157) (0.156) 
IMR (b)    -0.327** -0.309* -0.312* 
    (0.163) (0.159) (0.162) 
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Initial TFP 0.788*** 0.788*** 0.788*** 0.795*** 0.795*** 0.796*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Intercept 0.053 0.045 0.047 0.098 0.086 0.089 
 (0.063) (0.059) (0.063) (0.100) (0.098) (0.100) 
N 4207 4207 4207 4207 4207 4207 
RMSE 0.494 0.494 0.494 0.392 0.392 0.392 
R2 0.590 0.590 0.590 0.590 0.590 0.590 
R2 (w)    0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 (b)    0.765 0.765 0.765 
Notes: This table shows the OLS and CRE coefficients of Equation (2). 
Columns 1 and 4 consider the number of patent applications as main explanatory variables. 
Columns 2 and 5 replace these variables with the number of granted patents 
Columns 3 and 6 employ the number of granted patents stock. 
IMR stays for Inverse Mills Ratio and serves to control for sample selection problems. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance: *p<10%, **p<5%, ***p<1%. 
 
Does investing in AI innovation pay? 
Table 5 shows the GMM estimates obtained from Equation (3). Now, the main effect is represented by the 
within coefficient of AI innovation. Indeed, this coefficient captures the TFP gain of investing in new AI 
technologies. 
According to Column 2, returns to AI granted patents are positive and statistically significant (0.032, p<5%). 
This means that patents are effectively assigned to more productive innovations. In contrast, both patent 
applications and the stock of patents do not boost current productivity. 
Our results are also in line with the input elasticities found when applying traditional production function models 
(see Appendix A). However, given the Hansen test p-values, our coefficients seem to be less biased.10  
 
Table 5. AI innovation and TFP (GMM) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Patents Applications Granted Granted stock 
Ln(L) 0.704*** 0.874*** 0.749*** 
 (0.107) (0.105) (0.106) 
Ln(K) 0.453*** 0.249* 0.457*** 
 (0.135) (0.135) (0.141) 
AI patent  -0.000 0.032** 0.007 
 (0.004) (0.015) (0.008) 
Patent  0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IMR 0.345 1.091 1.056 
 (0.860) (0.922) (0.907) 
Intercept -1.223 -1.694** -1.930** 
 (0.765) (0.777) (0.806) 
N. 6617 6617 6617 
N. of firms 1738 1738 1738 
AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.002 0.000 
                                          
10 In Annex A, we may notice that with a Wooldridge (2009) estimator, we must reject the null hypothesis of instruments’ exogeneity, 
    whereas, as suggested by the Hansen test, in Table 5, we cannot reject it. 
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AR(2) p-value 0.993 0.857 0.967 
Hansen (p-value) 0.431 0.144 0.140 
 
Notes: This table shows the GMM estimates obtained from Equation (3).  
Columns 1-3 consider as main explanatory variables the number of patent applications, granted patents, and patent stock, respectively. 
IMR stands for Inverse Mills Ratio and serves to control for sample selection problems.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance: *p<10%, **p<5%, ***p<1%. 
 
 
Does AI innovation boost wages? 
The last question we tackle is whether TFP gains from AI innovation are associated with higher wage growth.  
Therefore, we apply the GMM specification adopted in Table 5 also to wage growth. As before, a GMM approach 
allows us to take into account firm and sector-level heterogeneity, providing general results.  
Table 6 clearly illustrates that an additional AI patent increases wages by 1.5 percentage points (Column 2). 
This means that part of the productivity gain from AI innovation is reflected in higher wage growth rates. 
Moreover, a smaller increase in wage growth is also observed in firms characterised by a higher number of AI 
applications and a higher stock of AI patents, despite the lack of a significant impact of these two variables on 
TFP. 
 
Table 6. AI innovation and wage growth (GMM) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Patents Applications Granted Granted stock 
L. Ln(w) -0.995*** -0.972*** -1.059*** 
 
(0.082) (0.064) (0.067) 
Ln(L) -1.204*** -1.121*** -1.191*** 
 
(0.122) (0.139) (0.156) 
Ln(K) 0.099 0.016 0.073 
 
(0.070) (0.042) (0.081) 
AI patent  0.002** 0.015*** 0.003* 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) 
Patent 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IMR 0.230 0.452* 0.505 
 
(0.588) (0.247) (0.381) 
N 4683 4683 4683 
N. of firms 1323 1323 1323 
AR(1) p-value 0.014 0.003 0.039 
AR(2) p-value 0.694 0.856 0.261 
Hansen (p-value) 0.322 0.762 0.314 
Notes: This table shows the GMM estimates obtained from Equation (3) when the dependent variable is the log of wage.  
Columns 1-3 consider as main explanatory variables the number of patent applications, granted patents, and patent stock, respectively. 
IMR stands for Inverse Mills Ratio and serves to control for sample selection problems.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Significance: *p<10%, **p<5%, ***p<1%. 
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4 Concluding remarks 
Our analysis on the impact of AI innovation on total factor productivity (TFP), with a particular focus on e-
commerce and fintech, can be summarized as follows.  
We first observe a general decline in the TFP of AI-patenting firms in the EU and US, while the rest of 
the world is catching up (Figure 11).  
This result is consistent with the literature showing a generally low, or declining productivity in the world, more 
specifically in OECD countries and advanced economies (Aghion, Bergeaud, Boppart, Klenow, & Li, 2019; 
Brynjolfsson, Rock, & Syverson, 2017; Fernald, 2016; Gordon, 2015; Storm, 2019). But as Schmelzing (2020) 
would say, this is not so surprising.  
What is also not very surprising for some scholars (HE, DU, & QIAO, 2020; Trappey, Trappey, Wang, & Hsieh, 
2018), is the fact that e-commerce & fintech AI patenting firms are better off in terms of TFP than 
non-e-commerce & fintech AI patenting firms (table 2). 
Firms with the highest TFP are those with highest average AI patents granted (table 3). Our results 
show that the act of filing an AI patent has no effect on TFP – significant effects on productivity are only 
observable when an AI patent is actually awarded. 
Our analysis (table 4), shows strong evidence of a catching-up hypothesis – that is, compared to their 
counterparts in other sectors, e-commerce and fintech firms were successful in achieving innovation, and, 
through granted AI patents, bringing their TFP closer to the levels shown by firms on the technological cutting 
edge.  
Indeed, the higher productivity observed in these sectors, associated with a higher share of granted AI patents, 
remains consistent, if – together with e-commerce and fintech firms – we also consider other firms in the 
finance and telecommunication sectors.  
It is interesting to see how granted patents can lead to catching up: 
 during periods of economic downturn, such as the case of the Japanese Patenting System, which 
facilitated the awarding of patents, with the goal of protecting firms and incentivising them to strive 
for continuous innovation and so catch up to the TFP frontier, which they were able to achieve 
(Maskus & McDaniel, 1999) 
 in competitive environments, such as discussed by Correa & Ornaghi (2014). 
Regardless of the industrial sector of the firm, every AI patent granted contributes to higher TFP by 3.2% (table 
5). Comparing these results with Benassi et al. (2020)’s 4IR patents applications, which documented an effect 
on TFP of approximately 1.5%, it can be said that this is in line with our results; given the fact that our analysis 
is more narrowly focused on AI patents and does not include the extended realm of 4th industrial revolution 
patents.  
Moreover, our results are not too distant from the analysis of patents granted and filed in the triad (EPO, JPO 
and USPTO), whose GMM registered a within effect of 3.8% higher TFP in US industries during economic 
recessions (Giovanis & Ozdamar, 2015). 
Finally, our results indicate that AI innovation boosts wages (table 6). In fact, we find that TFP gains from AI 
innovations are associated with higher wages. More specifically, an additional AI patent granted increases a 
firm’s wages by 1.5%, implying that part of the productivity gains that originate from AI innovation are reflected 
in positive wage growth.  
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5  Policy implications and future outlook  
Our analysis provides evidence that the most reasonable of the two likely explanations proposed is the catching-
up hypothesis – that is, firms lagging behind are the ones that more intensely adopt productivity-improving AI 
technologies.  
One policy implication could be to design policies to facilitate adoption of AI technology by firms currently on 
the productivity frontier (who in theory otherwise have less incentive to do this) and promote more competitive 
environments and competition by firms. 
The idea being to offset some of the main forces associated with technological innovation that hinder growth, 
such as implementation lags (Brynjolfsson et al. 2017) and reduced aggregate demand (realised output) due 
to unemployment and reduced labour participation (Gries & Naudé, 2018).  
This could be done for instance, by incentivising the licensing of AI technologies, to accelerate their spread 
without crowding out the innovation incentives of the firms that are catching up.  
The most important aspect of any policy intervention on AI innovation is to encourage sustained innovation, 
since suspending AI innovation activities has been shown to drive TFP down in the long term. Hence the need 
to sustain it on a continuous basis, as suggested by Huergo & Moreno (2011).  
Furthermore, as other scholars have pointed out, there is a strong and clear call for better data, both at firm 
and country level, which can also enable better cross-regional analysis. Certainly, a commonly shared definition 
of AI would contribute to good-quality data (Brundage et al., 2018) that could be used to design policies which 
are more informed and solidly grounded on scientific evidence. 
Future areas for investigation could include whether an increase in wages is accompanied by an increase in 
employment; mapping gender differences in management composition, exploring whether there is a relationship 
between AI & gender & education, and finally, exploring use cases of AI patenting firms in e-commerce and 
fintech. 
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Annexes 
Annex 1. Average wages and real GDP  
Figure 9. Average wages by country, 2010-16 
 
        
Sources: both patent and financial data by Van Roy et al. (2020). This database is a combination of the patents extracted from Orbis 
Patents and Bureau Van Dijk’s Orbis database, using the EC TIM text-mining tool.  
Notes: deflated wages are in thousands of euros; TFP is in natural logarithm 
 
Figure 10. Real GDP annual growth, 2010-21 
 
 
Source(s): World Economic Outlook  (April, 2020) 
 
Annex 2. Extracting TFP measure 
This appendix describes the three econometric techniques used to extract 𝐴𝑖𝑡 from Equation (1). All of them 
start from a log-linearization of (1):  
 
𝑙𝑛(𝑌𝑖𝑡) = 𝑙𝑛(q) + 𝑙𝑛(𝐴𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼𝑙𝑛(𝐾𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑖𝑡) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡,                         (A1) 
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where 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the log-transformation of the error term.  
The first technique used to extract 𝐴𝑖𝑡 from (A1) is the one proposed in Olley and Pakes (1996).  
This method relies on the following assumptions: 
a) investments, I𝑖𝑡, depend on both capital stock, 𝑙𝑛(𝐾𝑖𝑡),  and technical efficiency, 𝑙𝑛(𝐴𝑖𝑡); 
b) investments are strictly monotone in technical efficiency; 
c) technical efficiency is an unobservable scalar;  
d) the capital stock and investments are decided at time t-1; the labour input is decided once the shock 
is observed.  
These assumptions ensure the invertibility of investments in technical efficiency and lead to the partially 
identified model: 
𝑙𝑛(𝑌𝑖𝑡) = 𝑙𝑛(q) + φ(I𝑖𝑡 , 𝐾𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽ln (𝐿𝑖𝑡) + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 . 
 
This model can be estimated by using a non-parametric approach. In the first stage, we take advantage of the 
Markovian nature of productivity. We can exploit assumption (d) as a moment condition to estimate the 
production function parameters. Subsequently, we can estimate the following residual equation:  
𝑙𝑛(𝑌𝑖𝑡) − 𝛽ln (𝐿𝑖𝑡) = 𝑙𝑛(q) + g(ln (A𝑖𝑡−1), 𝜒𝑖𝑡) + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
         
    where g(.) is typically left unspecified and approximated by a n-th order polynomial and 𝜒𝑖𝑡 is an indicator 
function for the attrition in the market. 
The second technique used to extract 𝐴𝑖𝑡 from (A1) is the one proposed in Levinshon and Petrin (2003). This 
technique is similar to the one proposed by Olley and Pakes. However, Levinshon and Petrin aimed to overcome 
the empirical issue of zeros in the investment data. Therefore, they proposed instead to use intermediate inputs, 
𝑀𝑖𝑡,  as a proxy variable for investments, under the following assumptions: 
        a) once the technical efficiency shock is observed, firms immediately adjust the level of inputs according 
to demand function 𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑀(A𝑖𝑡 , K𝑖𝑡); 
        b) 𝑀𝑖𝑡 is strictly monotone in A𝑖𝑡 ; 
        c) A𝑖𝑡 is scalar unobservable in 𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑀(. ); 
        d) the capital stock is decided at time t-1, the labour input is decided once the shock is observed. 
The rest of the process follows the Olley and Pakes’ procedure. 
Finally, we use the method proposed in Wooldridge (2009). This is a more efficient approach for implementing 
the two methodologies mentioned above. In particular, Wooldridge suggests using a system GMM method to 
jointly estimate the two stages. In this way, input elasticities do not suffer from the collinearity issues identified 
in previous methods.  
Wooldridge’s methodology is based on the following, less stringent assumptions: 
a) productivity is an unknown function of unobserved state and flow variables; 
b) productivity's dynamics follow a first-order Markov chain process;  
c) productivity is an unknown function of lagged productivity. 
 
Table A1 reports the estimates of the Cobb-Douglas production function obtained with the techniques described 
above. Estimated elasticities are rather constant across the three methods and in line with traditional, aggregate 
estimates of factor elasticities (see, e.g., Barro, 1991).  
Notice that the Wald test on returns to scale rejects the hypothesis of constant returns to scale for the LP and 
WRDG estimates. However, on the basis of the Hansen over-identification test conducted for WRDG estimates, 
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we cannot rule out that our estimates suffer from time-varying endogeneity. This evidence justifies the use of 
the augmented GMM model provided in Table 5. 
Table 7. TFP derivation 
 OP LP WRDG 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ln(L) 0.794*** 0.870*** 0.765*** 
 (0.014) (0.088) (0.023) 
Ln(K) 0.270*** 0.253*** 0.285*** 
 (0.086) (0.052) (0.023) 
IMR -0.112*** -0.095*** -0.210*** 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.029) 
N 3532 3532 2355 
Wald (p-value) 0.31 0.30 0.000 
Hansen (p-value)   0.000 
Notes: This table shows the derivation of three different TFP measures:  
Column 1 considers the methodology proposed in Olley and Pakes (1996). 
Column 2 is the methodology proposed in Levinshon and Petrin (2003). 
Column 3 is Wooldridge’s (2009) estimator. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance: *p<10%, **p<5%, ***p<1%. 
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